Evidence - Dead Man\u27s Statute - Interpretation of  Transaction by Nemerovski, Howard N., S.Ed.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 55 Issue 8 
1957 
Evidence - Dead Man's Statute - Interpretation of "Transaction" 
Howard N. Nemerovski S.Ed. 
University of Michigan Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Evidence Commons, Torts Commons, and the Transportation Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Howard N. Nemerovski S.Ed., Evidence - Dead Man's Statute - Interpretation of "Transaction", 55 MICH. L. 
REV. 1177 (1957). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol55/iss8/10 
 
This Recent Important Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at 
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law 
Review by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, 
please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
1957] RECENT DECISIONS 1177 
EVIDENCE-DEAD MAN'S STATUTE-INTERPRETATION OF "TRANSACTION"-
Plaintiff was a passenger in an automobile which collided with one driven 
by defendant's intestate. Both drivers were killed, and plaintiff sued de-
fendant, administrator of intestate's estate, for personal injuries, alleging 
negligence. There were no other eye-witnesses to the collision, and the 
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trial court, relying upon the Alabama dead man's statute,1 would not per-
mit plaintiff to testify to any of the details or circumstances of the accident, 
or even to the fact that she had been involved in an accident with an auto-
mobile driven by the decedent. The jury found for defendant. On appeal, 
held, reversed. Plaintiff, passenger in an automobile with which decedent's 
car collided, may testify to the pertinent facts in an action against deced-
ent's estate for personal injuries resulting from the collision. An accident 
between two automobiles does not constitute a transaction between the 
deceased driver of one automobile and a passenger of the other automobile, 
and, consequently the Dead Man's Statute does not apply to disqualify the 
passenger from testifying. Gibson v. McDonald, (Ala. 1956) 91 S. (2d) 679. 
The purpose of the Dead Man's Statute is to prevent an interested sur-
vivor from benefiting from his own testimony when the estate of the de-
cedent is deprived of the decedent's version of the transaction.2 Without 
benefit of full information, the decedent's estate will be unable to contra-
dict or cross-examine the survivor,a who may as a result be tempted to 
perjure himself.4 The decision in the principal case rested upon the court's 
determination that as between plaintiff and the decedent there had been 
no "transaction" within the meaning of the Alabama Dead Man's Statute.5 
Torts are generally held to be transactions within dead man's statutes,6 and 
even in Alabama an automobile accident is a "transaction" if both parties 
are drivers of the colliding automobiles.7 In the two-driver situation there 
is present what has been termed "mutuality of participation" on the part 
of those involved so as to satisfy the statutory requirement of a transaction.8 
In the principal case, plaintiff was merely a passive victim who had no 
control over the collision. The court attached vital significance to this 
1 Ala. Code (1940), tit. 7, §433: "In civil suits and proceedings .•. no person having 
a pecuniary interest in the result of the suit or proceeding shall be allowed to testify 
against the party to whom his interest is opposed, as to any transaction with, or statement 
by, the deceased person whose estate is interested in the result of the suit or proceeding • 
• • . " Italics supplied. For discussions of the various types of dead man's statutes, see 46 
HARV. L. REV. 834 (1933), and VANDERBILT, MINIMUM STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 
334 (1949). 
2 Duggar v. Pitts, 145 Ala. 358, 39 S. 905 (1905). 
3 Van Meter, Admr. v. Goldfarb, 317 Ill. 620 at 623, 148 N.E. 391 (1925); 41 A.L.R. 
343 (1926). 
4See Cockley Milling Co. v. Bunn, 75 Ohio St._270 at 273, 79 N.E. 478 (1906). See 
also McCORMICK, EVIDENCE §65 (1954). 
5 Principal case at 681. See note 1 supra. 
6 5 JONES, EVIDENCE, 2d ed., §2228, 2261 (1926). 
7 Southern Natural Gas Co. v. Davidson, 225 Ala. 171, 142 S. 63 (1932), discussed in 
principal case at 681. 
s See Jeffords v. Muldrow, 104 S.C. 388 at 389, 89 S.E. 356 (1915): "The word 'trans-
action' .•. implies mutuality; something done by both in concert, in which both take 
some part." See also Borum v. Bell, Admr., 132 Ala. 85, 31 S. 454 (1902); Warten v. Black, 
195 Ala. 93, 70 S. 758 (1916). But d. Seligman v. Hammond, 205 Wis. 199, 236 N.W. 
115 (1931), holding testimony of one driver about movements of deceased other driver 
admissible, since the collision is not a mutual transaction. 
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difference, and concluded that plaintiff, being little more than an observer, 
was no more involved in a transaction than would be a pedestrian who was 
injured by the collision.o 
This requirement of "mutuality" and "concert of action" enunciated 
by the Alabama court is, it is submitted, an unwarranted and overly strict 
interpretation of the statute. Other courts have interpreted "transaction" 
to include situations in which the injured party was merely passive,1° or 
in which the witness was no more than an observer, and not a participant.11 
The term has been more broadly defined with reference to other considera-
tions, e.g., if the decedent could contradict the witness of his own knowl-
edge if alive,12 or if the alleged transaction was a "link in the chain of lia-
bility."13 At its broadest, transacting has been held to encompass every 
variety of affair which can form the subject of negotiations, interviews or 
actions between two persons, and also every method by which one person 
can derive impressions or information from the condition or language of 
another.14 Under any of these definitions the plaintiff in the principal case 
would have been disqualified from testifying. The Alabama court rejected 
them all, however, and relied heavily on a questionable Wisconsin holding 
to the effect that an accident is not a transaction between a passenger and 
his driver, so that neither party is disqualified from testifying against the 
survivor's estate.15 The holding in the principal case and the cases relied 
upon by the Alabama court may be explained as further examples of the 
widespread lack of sympathy with the Dead Man's Statute.16 Be that as it 
9 Principal case at 682. But query whether a pedestrian if in motion might not be a 
"mutual participant.'' See note IO infra. 
lOVan Meter v. Goldfarb, note 3 supra; Abelein v. Porter, 45 App. Div. 307, 61 N.Y.S. 
144 (1899). These cases suggest that the "pedestrian" analogy of the Alabama court in the 
principal case, note 9 supra, is not very strong support for their decision. But cf. Thomas 
v. Chicago, R. I.&: P. Ry., (St. Louis Ct. of App. 1925) 271 S.W. 862, in which an engineer 
of a train which killed decedent was allowed to testify in an action by decedent's estate. 
In the latter case, the court did not explain its decision, nor did it discuss the existence 
of a transaction. 
11 Griswold v. Hart, 205 N.Y. 384, 98 N.E. 918 (1912). But cf. Tucker v. Anderson, 
Admr., 172 Iowa 277 at 281, 154 N.W. 477 (1915), in which the witnesses who were 
allowed to testify were not interested in the suit. This may be a more sensible ground 
for the decision. 
12 Sherrill v. Wilhelm, 182 N.C. 673, llO S.E. 95 (1921). 
13 Boyd v. Williams, 207 N.C. 30, 175 S.E. 832 (1934); Davis v. Pearson, 220 N.C. 163, 
16 S.E. (2d) 655 (1941). 
14 Holcomb v. Holcomb, 95 N.Y. 316 at 325 (1884). Cf. Warten v. Black, note 8 supra, 
at 97. See also 57 W. VA. L. REv. 135 (1955). 
15 Krantz v. Krantz, 2ll Wis. 249, 248 N.W. 155 (1933). While the statute in that 
case required a "personal transaction," this difference in wording was rendered insignificant 
by the Alabama court in the principal case at 683, where the court interpreted the Ala-
bama Dead Man's Statute's requirement of a transaction to mean a "personal trans-
action." Cf. McCarthy v. Woolson, 205 N.Y.S. 507 at 509 (1924), which held that while 
the accident itself was not a transaction, the fact of decedent's having been a guest in the 
vehicle would constitute a transaction. See also discussion in 146 A.L.R. 250 (1943). 
16 See 2 WIGl\roRE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §§578, 578a (1940); Chadbourn, "California Dead 
Man Statute," 4 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 175 at 209 (1957); McCORMICK, EVIDENCE, §65 (1954). 
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may, the result is inconsistent with the clear mandate of the Alabama leg-
islature supporting the policy of the survivor's disqualification, for it ignores 
the spirit of the statute in severely restricting its application. Surely perjury 
by a party injured by a decedent is equally likely whether the injury was 
inflicted upon a passenger of the other car or upon the driver of the other 
car. There is the same disparity of information between the two parties to 
the action, and the same difficulty of contradiction and cross-examination.17 
We may indeed question the wisdom of the policy supporting the Dead 
Man's Statute,18 but where a legislature has approved that policy and given 
it statutory embodiment, it should be beyond the prerogative of the courts 
so to interpret the statute as to contravene the legislative intent. 
Howard N. Nemerovski, S.Ed. 
17 See cases cited in notes 2, 8, 4, supra. 
1s "Are not the estates of the living endangered daily by the present rule, which bars 
from proof so many honest claims? Can it be more important to save dead men's estates 
from false claims than to save living men's estates from loss by lack of proof?" 2 WIGMoRE, 
EVIDENCE, lid ed., §578, p. 696 (1940). 
